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Abstract 
This paper argues that global terrorist threat blurs the sharp dichotomy between the state of normality (“constitutionality”) and 
the state of exception, when the interest of preserving the political community and public order requires some temporary 
limitations of both fundamental rights and rule of law (“Rechtsstaat”) principles. Since the confrontation with the threat of 
international terrorism is of a different kind, policies aimed at preventing and abatement of such threats require a coherent 
framework of action and permanent measures on a daily basis. The dichotomy between normality and exceptional circumstances 
becomes less and less relevant, being gradually replaced by the antagonism between friends of the democratic order and its foes. 
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1. Introduction 
The constitutional order of any polity relies on a certain concept of the individual and of his or her relationship 
with society. Classical liberal constitutionalism places emphasis on the value of the individual, to whom a sphere of 
personal freedom is conceded, where governmental interferences are on principle excluded. Statal decision-making 
does naturally affect individuals and invades the individual spheres of personal freedom on a regular basis, but such 
interferences have to be justified in accordance with the rule of law principles.  
Despite a widely spread misconception, liberal constitutionalism does not favor the individual at the expense of 
the community. The very essence of the common good requires refraining from misusage of seemingly 
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overwhelming public interest against individual rights. The common good remains the paramount aim of state and 
society, but it cannot justify injustice inflicted even on the humblest human being. Policies aiming the public interest 
must be shaped in such a way that they leave an open space for respecting everyone’s personal dignity and freedom. 
As a result, government’s decision-making process often conflicts with the rule of law requirements. Political and 
legislative decisions which are deemed to promote the public interest can fail on grounds of lawlessness or 
unconstitutionality, if they encroach upon individual rights. 
2. Protecting the state by instituting the state of exception 
Anyhow, sometimes this painstaking diligence for personal freedom is abandoned in order to save the very 
existence of a community. Constitutionalism does not prescribe an exhaustive and unconditional protection of 
everyone’s rights at the cost of jeopardizing the survival of the state, but it places such critical issues outside its 
actual scope. Not coincidentally, some older constitutions and the doctrine prior to World War II  used the term of 
„suspending the Constitution”. At that time, the prevailing theory postulated a sharp dichotomy between the state of 
normality and the state of exception. Under normal circumstances, the Constitution did operate unhindered and 
personal rights and freedoms were considered the highest priority of the statal action. Normality could be briefly 
discontinued by states of exception, but their establishment should better be avoided. As Schmitt convincingly 
demonstrated (Schmitt, 1921) as a consequence of coping with exceptional circumstances by extraordinary means, a 
“sovereign dictatorship” could emerge. Such a dictatorship does not aim at reestablishing the disturbed legal order 
(as the usual “commissarial dictatorship”) (Voigt, 2013), but rather at replacing it with a new political regime 
shaped according to the ideology of the dictator(s). Apart from the seductive mirage of establishing a permanent 
dictatorship, exceptional powers are tempting for all rulers, wishing to unscrupulously fulfill their political agenda 
without the inherent constraints and limitations of any constitutional system. Another danger lies in the temptation 
to bring about or to stir a situation of crisis, only in order to obtain political laurels by resolving it using ostentatious 
power. Such an “arsonist as fireman” syndrome is particularly dangerous for democracy, because it encourages 
blatant undemocratic use of power for ostensive democratic aims (Kriele M., 1977, 69). 
In interwar Romania, the “state de siege” (stare de asediu) was repeatedly used between 1923 and 1938 (Popescu, 
1942; Negulescu & Alexianu, 1942), to an extent that eventually the respect for both parliamentary democracy and 
the values of the rule of law was severely compromised (Maner, 2004). By the same token, the use of exceptional 
states or the “suspension of the Constitution” had after all the advantage of protecting the fiction of unhindered 
constitutional supremacy and steady respect for human dignity and of facilitating thereby a possible return to a 
“normal” regime. 
3. The Terrorist threat and the “friend-foe” dichotomy 
The emergence since the ‘70s of the terrorist threat poses an unprecedented challenge for the architectural 
structure of the constitutional state. Such a challenge may impose a reconfiguration of some basic concepts of 
constitutionalism in a similar way to the shaping of rule of law theories as an answer to the crystallization of the 
secular absolutist state in the 17th century (Jakab, 2011, 59). The main difficulty lies in the asymmetric structure of 
the conflict between foes with radically divergent visions on the value of human life and dignity. The fight against 
an enemy that has little respect for the life of innocent people, or even boasts about the high number of his victims, 
claims a high level of commitment for classical rule of law principles from political and military rulers. Especially 
the ban of torture, a real “Tabu” of modern political and constitutional scholarship (Isensee, 2003), is heavily put to 
the test.  
The main difference between the current developments and the classical situations of “suspension of the 
constitution” lies in the fact that the terrorist threat cannot be contained within fixed or at least determinable limits 
of space and time. Furthermore, due to the conspiratorial character of terrorist activities, the sphere of persons 
affected by the statal defensive measures can hardly be anticipated. 
However, the main issue is whether the terrorist “foe” deserves to be dealt with in the spirit of the values he does 
not share at all, and against which he is actually fighting, especially when it is obvious that he invokes such values 
only for tactical grounds. 
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The idea of creating a special type of criminal law, namely a “criminal law for foes” (Feindstrafrecht), as 
opposed to the “criminal law for citizens” (Bürgerstrafrecht) was drafted in Germany at the mid-‘80s, as a reaction 
to the terrorist threat from the RAF a decade earlier (Jacobs, 1985; Jacobs 2004; Rüthers, 2009). In this reemergence 
of the old schmittian friend-foe dichotomy, viewed as the essential feature of any political issue (Schmitt, 1932), 
lurks the risk of restricting or even eliminating the constitutional guarantees of personal freedom, under the cloak of 
criminal law (Rüthers, 2009). 
It is remarkable that such incentives from criminal sciences are sometimes positively received in the field of 
constitutional theory (Depenheuer, 2008; Isensee, 2004). The classical constitutions, or at least the German 
“Grundgesetz”, are deemed to be insufficiently “armed” for the case of emergency posed by a hypothetical attack by 
terrorists acting on international scale. 
The defense of classical constitutionalism approach based on the basic rights and constitutional guarantees of 
personal freedom relies heavily on stressing the fact that, so far, terrorism as such did not seriously jeopardize the 
very survival of western political and constitutional order. The danger lurks rather in changing our way of life as a 
consequence the counter-terrorism measures. Under such an approach, the real threat comes from the laws seeking 
to combat terrorism at the cost of curtailing constitutional values, as the British House of Lords stated in 2004, in the 
Belmarsh Case (quoted by Jakab, 2011, at 65). From a more radical point of view, the emphasis on primarily 
securing the state, seen as the main institutional guarantee of the basic freedoms, reveals a kind of secular fetishism, 
along a line of thinking going back to Hobbes, and including Hegel and Carl Schmitt (Solomon, 2008). 
4. Conclusion 
For the time being, the concern for primarily preserving our political way of life seems justified. The danger of 
distorting our fundamental constitutional values, put in balance against the actual harm produced so far by terrorist 
attacks, legitimizes a very cautious attitude towards the emergency measures challenging the rule of law architecture 
of the state. 
But such challenge still remains. The arguments against the harsh counter-terrorism measures are only 
circumstantial. What can we do when the survival of the state and of our community is actually at stake? Which 
measures are to be taken against a terrorist threat that puts in jeopardy the life of several millions of our fellow-
citizens? There is no normative answer to such questions. The ghost of Carl Schmitt, with his friend-foe dichotomy, 
haunts further the realm of constitutional and legal theory.  
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